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BALANCING LENITY, RATIONALITY, AND
FINALITY: A CASE FOR SPECIAL VERDICT
FORMS IN CASES INVOLVING OVERLAPPING
FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSES
MEGHAN A. FERGUSON†
ABSTRACT
The Framers placed a high premium on jury independence and
viewed the jury’s ability to dispense lenity as an important check on
the legislative and executive branches. Many features of the criminal
justice system are designed to interpose the jury between the accused
and overzealous legislators and prosecutors. The general verdict and
the absolute finality of acquittals, for example, empower the jury to
acquit a defendant against the weight of the evidence. Although these
features of the criminal justice system were conceived to protect
defendants, they may be more harmful than helpful to defendants,
given changes in the criminal justice system since the Founding. The
proliferation of overlapping federal offenses, for instance, is a change
that directly implicates the opacity of the general verdict. This Note
explains that, in a trial resulting in an acquittal on some charges and a
mistrial on other charges, a lack of transparency in what the jury has
necessarily decided can harm the defendant by making it difficult for
him to invoke the collateral estoppel protection. This Note proposes
using special verdict forms to prevent jury inconsistency and provide
clarity in cases involving multiple federal criminal offenses based on
the same underlying facts.
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INTRODUCTION
After thirteen weeks of trial and four days of deliberation, a jury
acquitted former Enron executive Scott Yeager of securities fraud but
1
failed to reach a verdict on the insider trading charges against him.
When the government sought to retry Yeager on the insider trading
2
counts, he invoked the collateral estoppel protection as a means to
avoid reprosecution. To invoke this protection, a defendant must
establish that the prosecution is seeking to relitigate an issue that the
3
jury already decided in an acquittal. In its effort to relitigate the
insider trading counts on which the jury failed to reach a verdict, the
government argued that Yeager could not invoke the collateral
estoppel protection because he could not show that, in acquitting him
of securities fraud, “the jury necessarily resolved in his favor an issue
4
of ultimate fact” needed to convict him for insider trading.
Although the offenses of securities fraud and insider trading do
not necessarily overlap, Yeager argued that the charges in his case
5
were based on the same underlying conduct. But neither the
indictment nor the jury’s acquittal of Yeager on the securities fraud
6
7
count make this clear. And the district court (Yeager I) and the
8
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Yeager II)
reached different conclusions about what Yeager’s jury necessarily

1. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 (2009) (noting that the trial
court, after urging the jury to reach a final verdict on all counts, ultimately took the jury’s
verdict after four full days of deliberation, entering judgment on the acquittals and declaring a
mistrial on the hung counts).
2. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a feature of the protection against double
jeopardy. Anne Bowen Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases: Reuse of Evidence After
Acquittal, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989). Criminal defendants like Yeager invoke the collateral
estoppel protection to bar reprosecution by establishing that the earlier acquittal resolved an
ultimate issue of the successive charge in the defendant’s favor. See id. (“Collateral estoppel is
most commonly invoked to foreclose an issue resolved by an earlier acquittal and thus to bar
prosecution entirely.”). Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the collateral estoppel
doctrine in the criminal context.
3. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the leading Supreme Court case on collateral
estoppel, explains that the protection “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443.
4. Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2370.
5. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
7. United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
8. United States v. Yeager (Yeager II), 521 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2008).
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9

decided through its acquittal. When the Supreme Court heard
10
Yeager’s collateral estoppel challenge in 2009 (Yeager III), it
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the record—that no rational
jury could have acquitted Yeager of securities fraud without also
acquitting him of the insider trading charges. Reversing the Fifth
Circuit’s holding that the hung counts affected the preclusive effect of
the acquitted counts, the Court held that, as a matter of law, an
acquittal on some counts can have collateral estoppel effects in a
11
successive prosecution of mistried counts.
Yeager III acknowledged that determining the preclusive effect
of Yeager’s security fraud acquittal involved a “fact-intensive analysis
of the voluminous record” that the court of appeals “may revisit . . . in
12
light of the Government’s arguments before this Court.” The Court,
however, failed to offer any guidance on how a lower court should
proceed in determining what a jury necessarily decided in its
13
acquittals. This Note proposes a solution that would simplify this
analysis in cases like Yeager involving overlapping but not
coextensive criminal offenses: special verdict forms tracking the
common issues of law and fact for the jury to complete in deliberation
and return in addition to its general verdict of guilt or acquittal.
Part I explains why modern criminal defendants are vulnerable
to successive prosecution, provides an overview of Supreme Court
precedent on successive prosecution and collateral estoppel, and
presents the Yeager case as an illustration of the problem. Part II
explores the strong interest in preserving the jury’s independence in
the criminal context through the lens of the Supreme Court’s “do14
nothing approach” to verdict inconsistency, the traditional disfavor
of special verdicts, and the continuing debate over the doctrine of jury

9. Id. at 377–78 (rejecting the district court’s conclusion that the jury acquitted Yeager on
the ground that he did not participate in the fraud and concluding instead that “the jury must
have found when it acquitted Yeager that Yeager himself did not have any insider information
that contradicted what was presented to the public”).
10. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
11. Id. at 2362–63 (“The question presented in this case is whether an apparent
inconsistency between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a
verdict on other counts affects the preclusive force of the acquittals under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We hold that it does not.”).
12. Id. at 2370.
13. Id.
14. See infra note 70.
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nullification. Part III recommends using special verdict forms to
track issues of law and fact common to overlapping but not
coextensive federal criminal offenses.
I. THE PROBLEM: MODERN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS INCREASINGLY
VULNERABLE TO SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION
Criminal defendants have become more vulnerable to successive
prosecution as the number of federal criminal offenses has grown.
16
The Supreme Court noted this phenomenon in Ashe v. Swenson, in
which it deemed the collateral estoppel doctrine part of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy:
[U]nder early federal criminal statutes . . . . [a] single course of
criminal conduct was likely to yield but a single
offense. . . . [W]ith . . . the
extraordinary
proliferation
of
overlapping . . . offenses, it became possible for prosecutors to spin
out a startlingly numerous series of offenses from a single alleged
criminal transaction. . . . [T]he potential for unfair and abusive
reprosecutions became far more pronounced. . . . The federal courts
soon recognized the need to prevent such abuses through the
17
doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . .
18

Given the proliferation of federal offenses and strong
19
prosecutorial incentives to maximize convictions, the threat of
successive prosecution is a major concern for modern criminal
defendants. Against this background, this Part considers the
development of the Supreme Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence
and the role of collateral estoppel in preventing successive litigation.
It concludes by using the Yeager case to highlight the difficulty of

15. This Note uses the terms nullification and lenity to refer to the same phenomenon,
namely, “the jury’s return of a verdict of not guilty in a criminal case notwithstanding
unequivocal evidence of guilt of the offense charged.” NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER,
THE LAW OF JURIES 191 (2d ed. 2009).
16. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
17. Id. at 445 n.10.
18. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., 5 ENGAGE 23, 23 (2004), available at http://www.
fed-soc.org/doclib/20080313_CorpsBaker.pdf (“There are over 4,000 offenses that carry criminal
penalties in the United States Code. This is a record number, and reflects a one-third increase
since 1980.”).
19. The Department of Justice allocates funds to U.S. Attorneys’ offices based on
conviction rates. In addition, many prosecutors have political ambitions, and being “tough on
crime” appeals to voters. Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution
Phenomenon in the Federal System, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 633−35 (1995).
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making collateral estoppel determinations in cases in which the
conduct alleged supports multiple overlapping but not coextensive
charges.
A. Overcriminalization, Double Jeopardy, and the Collateral
Estoppel Protection
The redundancy and breadth of federal criminal offenses give
20
prosecutors the ability to overcharge defendants. In addition to
having an extensive array of overlapping and open-ended charges at
their disposal, federal prosecutors have broad discretion over the
21
charging decision. Prosecutors also control the decision whether to
pursue a successive prosecution. (The main limits on this decision—
22
23
the Department of Justice’s Petite Policy, resource constraints, and
24
the attitudes of federal judges —can be manipulated.)

20. The commentary on the implications of the explosive growth of federal criminal law is
extensive. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 passim (2005) (describing “common
features connecting the different forms of overcriminalization”); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double
Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183,
1190 (2004) (“The proliferation of offenses is driven by political forces that encourage
legislators to add to prosecutors’ arsenals and discourage the repeal of criminal laws.
Legislatures respond to newsworthy events or trends with new criminal provisions that often
overlap with existing provisions.”).
21. Lear, supra note 19, at 632 (“United States Attorneys have traditionally operated with
almost complete autonomy. Even today the Justice Department rarely interferes in the charging
decisions of local offices.” (footnotes omitted)); Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the
Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. Rev. 1297, 1320–21 (1999) (“The prosecutor has
nearly unfettered discretion to decide who to charge, what charges to file, and when to file
them . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
22. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960) (announcing the Department of
Justice’s successive-prosecution policy for the first time). It is the Justice Department’s policy
not to reprosecute unless the initial prosecution leaves “substantial federal
interest[s] . . . demonstrably unvindicated.” UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-2.031
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.
htm#9-2.031.
23. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 n.15 (1993) (“Surely . . . the Government
must be deterred from abusive, repeated prosecutions of a single offender for similar offenses
by the sheer press of other demands upon prosecutorial and judicial resources.”).
24. Federal judges do not appreciate prosecutors wasting the court’s time and the public’s
money without a substantial federal interest. Lear, supra note 19, at 631.
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In addition to imposing great costs on individual defendants and
26
the criminal justice system at large, successive prosecution implicates
27
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The leading Supreme Court precedent
on what constitutes the “same offence” for double jeopardy purposes
28
is the Blockburger same-elements test, which provides that, so long
as two offenses contain a separate element, they are not technically
29
the same. The Court extended the same-elements test to the
30
successive prosecution context in United States v. Dixon.
Three years before deciding Dixon, the Court had rejected the
use of the Blockburger same-elements test in the successive
31
prosecution context in Grady v. Corbin, which held that the
government could not retry a defendant if proof of “conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
32
prosecuted” was required to convict. Dixon rejected this sameconduct test as “unstable in application,” however, making Grady a
33
short-lived precedent.
25. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (“To permit a second trial after an
acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high
risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so
that ‘even though innocent he may be found guilty.’” (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 188 (1957))); Green, 355 U.S. at 187−88 (“[T]he State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.”).
26. See Lear, supra note 19, at 647 (explaining that crowded federal dockets are such that
every criminal case that goes forward for reprosecution means that one less civil jury trial will
occur); id. at 648−49 (describing successive prosecutions as a resource drain on U.S. Attorneys’
offices); id. at 650−51 (explaining that successive prosecution undermines confidence in the
system).
27. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person “shall . . . be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
29. Id. at 304 (“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not.”).
30. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697 (1993).
31. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. 688.
32. Id. at 510 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
33. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 709. Two years after Grady was decided, the Court had to recognize
a major exception to the same-conduct test based on the “longstanding authority” that
prosecution for a substantive offense does not bar subsequent prosecution for conspiring to
commit that offense. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1992) (holding that an
underlying offense and conspiracy to commit that offense were “separate offenses for double
jeopardy purposes”).
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Unlike the Grady same-conduct test, the Blockburger sameelements test embraced by Dixon in the successive prosecution
context focuses on the statutory definitions of crimes to determine
34
whether they are the “same offence.” Because the Blockburger test
does not take the conduct alleged into account, it is, as Dixon
suggested, easier to apply than the Grady same-conduct test. It is,
however, also easier for prosecutors to manipulate. It would be
permissible under Blockburger for a prosecutor unsatisfied with an
acquittal to reprosecute the same conduct by charging the defendant
with an offense containing one element not contained in the initially
charged offense. Fortunately for criminal defendants, there is a
protection besides the Blockburger test that may shield them from
such an overzealous prosecutor: the collateral estoppel doctrine.
The collateral estoppel doctrine bars successive prosecution
requiring relitigation of issues already decided in the defendant’s
35
favor. It thus serves an important role in the Court’s double
jeopardy jurisprudence by providing a backstop for the Blockburger
same-elements test. In the absence of the collateral estoppel
protection, prosecutors could harass defendants through successive
prosecution on technically separate offenses involving identical
36
conduct. The collateral estoppel doctrine is now recognized as part
37
of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy, but it
originally developed in the civil context. In United States v.
38
Oppenheimer, Justice Holmes made the case for extending the
collateral estoppel protection to the criminal context, reasoning that,
“[i]t cannot be that the safeguards of the person . . . are less than
39
those that protect from a liability in debt.”
The collateral estoppel doctrine’s civil roots have complicated
the doctrine’s application in the criminal context. In the civil context,
special verdicts can be used to determine what a jury necessarily
34. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 (“The same-elements test . . . inquires whether each offense
contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double
jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.”).
35. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
36. According to Justice Souter, “[i]f a separate prosecution were permitted for every
offense arising out of the same conduct, the government could manipulate the definitions of
offenses, creating fine distinctions among them and permitting a zealous prosecutor to try a
person again and again for essentially the same criminal conduct.” Dixon, 509 U.S. at 747
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
37. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
38. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
39. Id. at 87.
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decided. In the criminal context, however, the general verdict makes
this analysis very difficult, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Ashe:
Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general
verdict . . . this approach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a
prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence,
charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational
jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that
40
which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’

Ashe cautioned lower courts to approach the determination of
41
what a jury necessarily decided “with realism and rationality.”
Taking a more “technically restrictive” approach, the Court
explained, “would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule
of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case
where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of
42
acquittal.”
The Ashe analysis is a fact-intensive one requiring close
examination of the prior proceeding’s record including the pleadings,
43
evidence, and indictment. In this way, it is more like the Grady
same-conduct test, which looks at the conduct underlying the
successive charges, than the Blockburger same-elements test, which
looks only at the formal elements of the offenses. But the Ashe
analysis may suffer from the same instability that led the Court to
44
reject the Grady same-conduct test in Dixon. In Yeager’s case, for
example, the district court and the Fifth Circuit reached critically
45
different conclusions after conducting the Ashe analysis.
B. A Closer Look at United States v. Yeager
The prosecution of Enron Broadband Services (EBS) executive
Scott Yeager readily illustrates the problems posed by a general
verdict of acquittal for a defendant seeking to bar a successive
criminal prosecution. In 2004, a grand jury indicted Yeager on 126
40. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added) (quoting Daniel K. Mayers & Fletcher L.
Yarbough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38–39
(1960)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 33.
45. See supra notes 7–9.
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counts of five federal offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit securities
and wire fraud, (2) securities fraud, (3) wire fraud, (4) insider trading,
46
and (5) money laundering. Specifically, the indictment alleged that
Yeager and two other senior EBS executives purposefully misled the
public—in an effort to inflate the value of EBS stock and enrich
themselves—about an intelligent telecommunications network that
47
EBS was developing. The allegedly false statements and material
omissions were made at an analyst conference in 2000 and in press
48
releases.
The jury acquitted Yeager of the securities fraud, wire fraud, and
49
conspiracy charges, but failed to reach a verdict on the insider
50
trading and money laundering charges. When the government
sought to retry Yeager on the hung counts, Yeager challenged the
successive prosecution on collateral estoppel grounds, arguing that
“(1) the acquitted . . . securities fraud . . . counts allege the same
factual allegations that underpin the insider trading counts, and (2)
the evidence presented at trial on the acquitted counts pertaining to
alleged false statements and omissions made at the 2000 analyst
conference and in press releases, is the very same evidence the
51
government submitted on the insider trading counts.”
The district court and the Fifth Circuit read the tea leaves of the
jury’s acquittal of Yeager on the fraud counts differently. The Fifth
Circuit concluded in Yeager II that “the jury must have found when it
46. United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Count
One [of the indictment] charged Defendant Yeager with conspiracy to commit securities fraud
and wire fraud. Count Two of the Indictment charged Defendant Yeager with the substantive
offense of securities fraud in connection with allegedly false statements and material omissions
at a January 20, 2000 Analyst Conference. Counts Three through Six charged Defendant
Yeager with the substantive offense of wire fraud in connection with press releases issued by
Enron Broadband Services on January 31, 2000 through May 15, 2000. Counts Twenty-Seven
through Forty-Six charged Defendant Yeager with insider trading based on trades of
Enron stock made on January 21, 2000 through August 23, 2000. Counts Sixty-Seven through
One Hundred Sixty-Five charged Defendant Yeager with money laundering based on
transactions on February 7, 2000 through September 18, 2001.” (citations omitted)).
47. United States v. Yeager (Yeager II), 521 F.3d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The indictment
alleged that [the three EBS defendants] purposely sought to deceive the public by making false
statements about EBS’s progress and financial condition. . . . The indictment also charged [the
three EBS defendants] with selling millions of dollars of Enron stock while making these false
statements.”).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 376.
50. “The jury hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering”
that were based on insider trading. Id.
51. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
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acquitted Yeager that Yeager himself did not have any insider
52
information that contradicted what was presented to the public.” In
contrast, the district court in Yeager I interpreted the jury’s acquittal
to say that Yeager did not knowingly and willingly participate in a
scheme to defraud in connection with the 2000 Analyst Conference
53
and press releases, but not that he lacked insider information. In
Yeager II, however, the Fifth Circuit ruled out the possibility that the
jury acquitted Yeager based on a finding that he did not participate in
54
making the alleged material misrepresentations.
Despite reading his securities fraud acquittal differently, both the
district court and the Fifth Circuit denied Yeager’s motion to dismiss
the counts in the new indictment. The district court concluded that
“Yeager’s acquittal on the conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud
counts of the Indictment does not completely bar the government
from retrying [him] on the charges of insider trading and money
55
56
laundering.” Alternatively, relying on United States v. Larkin, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the presence of the apparently
inconsistent hung counts “ma[de] it impossible . . . to decide with any
certainty what the jury necessarily determined” and that therefore
57
Yeager could not invoke the collateral estoppel protection.

52. Yeager II, 521 F.3d at 378.
53. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (“[T]he Court finds that the jury necessarily
determined that Defendant Yeager did not knowingly and willfully participate or agree to
participate in a scheme to defraud in connection with the alleged false statements or material
omissions made at the analyst conference and press releases. . . . [This] defense, if believed by
the jury, would not negate the government’s evidence and contention that Yeager possessed and
used material nonpublic information at the time he made trades of Enron stock. Yeager’s
defense would only establish that Defendant Yeager did not participate in the overall scheme to
defraud.”).
54. At Yeager’s trial, the judge instructed the jury that, to convict Yeager on securities
fraud, the government needed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that “Yeager participated
in making material representations or omissions” (first element) and that “Yeager acted
‘willfully, knowingly and with intent to defraud’” (second element). Yeager II, 521 F.3d at 377.
According to the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the record, the jury could have acquitted Yeager of
securities fraud “on the basis of the first element by concluding that there were no
misrepresentations or omissions made at the conference” or “on the basis of the second element
by finding that Yeager did not knowingly make misrepresentations and omissions because he
believed the presentations were truthful,” that is, by concluding that Yeager acted in good faith.
Id.
55. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
56. United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1979).
57. Yeager II, 521 F.3d at 378. The court relied on circuit precedent in reaching this
holding. Id. at 379 (citing Larkin, 605 F.2d at 1370).
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In Yeager III, the Supreme Court based its narrow legal holding
58
on the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the record and reversed the Fifth
Circuit’s holding, overruling Larkin and holding an inconsistent hung
59
count to be a “nonevent” that does not affect the Ashe analysis.
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the disparate readings of
the jury’s acquittal in Yeager I and II, it “decline[d] to engage in a
fact-intensive analysis of the voluminous record” to determine what
60
the jury necessarily decided when it acquitted Yeager. Instead,
without providing any guidance on how to execute this task, the
Court left the Fifth Circuit to “revisit its factual analysis [in Yeager II]
61
in light of the Government’s arguments [in Yeager III].”
As this Part has explained, Ashe provided lower courts with
some general direction about what to look at in determining what a
62
jury necessarily decided in acquitting a defendant. Specifically, Ashe
directs courts to conduct a fact-intensive examination of the prior
63
proceeding’s record. On remand, the Fifth Circuit explained that
“freed from the chains of Larkin it is clear that under our initial Ashe
analysis the jury made a finding in acquitting Yeager that precludes
64
prosecution on insider trading.” The court of appeals declined the
Supreme Court’s “invitation to revisit” the Ashe analysis, denying the
government’s motion requesting a hearing to reconsider other
65
possible grounds for the jury’s acquittals.
The dramatically different interpretations by the Fifth Circuit
and the district court regarding the jury’s decision to acquit Yeager
raise questions about the Ashe analysis. Major collateral estoppel
consequences flow from this analysis. Indeed, Yeager I and II’s
different readings of the jury’s acquittal carry opposite collateral

58. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2370 (2009) (“Our grant of
certiorari was based on the assumption that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the record
was correct.”).
59. Id. at 2367 (“Unlike Ashe, the case before us today entails a trial that included multiple
counts rather than a trial for a single offense. And, while Ashe involved an acquittal for that
single offense, this case involves an acquittal on some counts and a mistrial declared on others.
The reasoning in Ashe is nevertheless controlling because, for double jeopardy purposes, the
jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts was a nonevent and the acquittals
on the fraud counts are entitled to the same effect as Ashe’s acquittal.”).
60. Id. at 2370.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Yeager (Yeager IV), 334 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2009).
65. Id.
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estoppel implications. Yeager I’s conclusion that the jury did not
necessarily decide the insider trading charges against him would not
bar a successive prosecution. The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that “the
possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact
in all of the charges” would, however, trigger the collateral estoppel
66
protection. Discrepancies seem inevitable when courts have only a
general verdict in hand.
II. NULLIFICATION NOSTALGIA IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Many features of the criminal justice system, including the
general verdict, are justified by nullification—the jury’s “implicit
power” to exercise lenity and acquit a defendant against the weight of
67
the evidence. There is great debate over whether juries have the
right to nullify, and the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
the question. Many of the Court’s decisions, however, including its
approach to inconsistent verdicts, exhibit nostalgia for the Framer’s
68
view of nullification as a tyranny-preventive device. This Part first
explores the Supreme Court’s invocation of nullification in United
69
States v. Powell, the leading case on inconsistent verdicts. It then
proceeds to reexamine the traditional disfavor of special verdicts in
the criminal context based on preserving the possibility of
nullification. This Part concludes by describing how the nullification
debate has evolved from the time of the Framers.
A. Nullification-Regarding Features of the Criminal Justice System
70

1. The Supreme Court’s Do-Nothing Approach to Verdict
71
Inconsistency. Internal inconsistency in the jury’s verdict makes a

66. Yeager III, 129 S. Ct. at 2368–69.
67. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: An Empirical Perspective, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
425, 426 (2008) (“The criminal jury’s power to deliver a verdict counter to both law and
evidence resides in the fact that a general verdict requires no explanation by the jury.” (footnote
omitted)). But see id. (“[J]ury nullification does not always lead to ‘merciful’ acquittals, but
rather may engage jurors’ emotions that may result in a vindictive verdict.” (footnote omitted)).
68. See id. (“The framers of the U.S. Constitution considered the jury in criminal trials to
be a fundamental safeguard against the power of the government.” (footnote omitted)).
69. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
70. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 772 (1998).
71. See Leipold, supra note 21, at 1349–50 (“When a jury acquits a person of one crime
(accepting a bribe, for example) but convicts them of a related crime (failure to report the bribe
income) the verdict is internally inconsistent.”).
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defendant vulnerable to successive prosecution by making it more
difficult to determine what a jury necessarily decided and therefore
more difficult to invoke the collateral estoppel protection. Verdict
inconsistency indicates that the jury failed to follow the court’s
instructions, but it does not indicate the reason for this failure. The
jury may have been confused or mistaken about the evidence or
72
instructions, which is more likely in cases like Yeager, in which there
is legal and evidentiary complexity involving multiple offenses with
73
common issues of underlying fact.
Inconsistency can also result when the jury decides to exercise its
74
power to dispense lenity. The Supreme Court has held that
inconsistent verdicts must stand because there is no way to tell
whether the source of verdict inconsistency was “mistake,
75
compromise, or lenity.” Although courts engage in various pre76
verdict attempts to prevent the jury from making mistakes, they are
unwilling to disturb the possibility that the jury exercised lenity once
a verdict has been returned. Thus, early intervention to prevent
inconsistency borne of jury mistake and confusion is crucial; once the
jury returns inconsistent verdicts, nothing can be done.
The Supreme Court established its do-nothing approach to
inconsistent verdicts in Powell. A jury acquitted Betty Lou Powell of
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute but convicted her of using
77
a telephone to facilitate that crime. Powell sought to reverse the
inconsistent conviction on collateral estoppel grounds, arguing that
the jury’s acquittal on the possession charge necessarily decided an

72. See Muller, supra note 70, at 798 (“Through mistake or confusion, a jury might
misunderstand the elements of the crime, the allocation of the burden of proof, the effect of the
defendant’s failure to testify, or other key aspects of the court’s instructions.”).
73. See id. at 776 (“One of the most fertile settings for producing logically inconsistent
verdicts is the compound crime—the crime . . . that has another charged crime as one of its
elements. As these sorts of offenses have proliferated in recent years, so too has the opportunity
for inconsistent verdicts.” (footnote omitted)).
74. Leipold, supra note 21, at 1350 (noting that a jury may “t[ake] pity on the defendant
and partially nullif[y] the charges”).
75. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
76. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 883−84
(1999) (“There is no dispute that jury mistakes are to be avoided. To this end, courts have
experimented with a variety of changes in procedure, such as allowing jurors to take notes, to
submit written questions to the judge, to receive preliminary instructions, to take written
instructions into the jury room, and to be instructed in plain language that laypersons can
understand. All of these procedural changes, many drawn from empirical studies, are directed
toward helping juries avoid mistakes.” (footnotes omitted)).
77. Powell, 469 U.S. at 60.
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78

element of the phone count. The Supreme Court refused to reverse
her conviction, reasoning that, “the jury, convinced of guilt, [may
have] properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and
then through mistake, compromise, or lenity arrived at an
79
inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.” In addition to the
possible exercise of lenity, the Powell Court noted the government’s
inability to seek review and its general reluctance to speculate about
jury deliberations as reasons for doing nothing about the
80
inconsistency.
2. Reexamining the Traditional Disfavor of Special Verdicts. Like
the do-nothing approach to inconsistent verdicts, unwillingness to
look behind the general verdict has been justified by the need to
81
preserve the jury’s independence and the possibility of nullification.
Although it is a common refrain that special verdicts are disfavored in
the
criminal
context,
“[t]his
truism
is
often
recited
reflexively . . . rather than as a conclusion following sustained
82
analysis.” There is no absolute prohibition against the use of special
83
verdicts in the criminal context. Indeed, they are required in federal
84
treason cases. In addition, when it is important for purposes of
federal sentencing to determine a particular fact, supplemental
85
special interrogatories are often used.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 65.
80. Id. at 68−69.
81. See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1982) (“Some of the antipathy
toward special verdicts in criminal trials has its roots in the doctrine of ‘jury nullification.’”).
82. Leipold, supra note 21, at 1355 n.192.
83. Desmond, 670 F.2d at 416.
84. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (requiring a finding of an overt act in treason cases, or a
confession in open court).
85. For example, special interrogatories have been utilized in determining whether and
what type of weapon the defendant used in a violent or drug-related crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 30 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he district courts are vested with
discretion to employ special verdict forms in [criminal] cases—i.e. where a section 924(c) count
[of knowingly importing into, or possessing within, the United States firearms or ammunition]
lists both a regular ‘firearm’ and a ‘machinegun.’” (second alteration in original)); United
States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1235–36 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[The court may] submit[] special
interrogatories . . . to the jury, requiring that if the jury returns a guilty verdict . . . it must specify
which category . . . of weapons it . . . found the defendant was using or carrying.”); United
States v. Smith, 938 F.2d 69, 70 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing how special verdicts, though
“generally not favored in criminal cases,” are permitted, including in situations where “the
defendant’s offense turns on factual findings”). Special verdict forms have also been used to
determine “factors that increase applicable statutory maximum sentences,” James K. Robinson,
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Courts have used special verdicts as a means to prevent jury
confusion and mistake in complex criminal cases. The Ninth Circuit,
for example, requires special verdicts “when a court permits facts
which pose a genuine possibility of juror confusion to go to the
86
87
jury.” The increasing use of special verdicts in RICO cases
indicates judicial awareness that greater complexity limits the
effectiveness of general verdicts as a defendant-protective device. In
88
United States v. Coonan, for example, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit approved special interrogatories designed to prevent
prejudicial spillover between multiple defendants and to vindicate the
defendant’s constitutional right to unanimity on the predicate
89
offenses.
General verdicts are thought to preserve the jury’s ability to
dispense lenity against the weight of the evidence because the jury,
when it returns a general verdict of acquittal, does not have to explain
90
its decision, which is absolutely final. It was not uncommon in
seventeenth-century criminal trials for a judge to force a jury to
disclose its reasons, sending the jury back for further discussion if the
91
judge disagreed with its reasoning. Therefore, the Framers were
concerned that special verdicts could be used to hamstring the jury
92
93
into convicting a defendant. In 1670, the famous Bushell’s Case

Preface: Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals, 1999-2000, 89 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048–49 (2001) (explaining that after the
“Apprendi decision . . . led to a flood of challenges to federal sentences,” federal prosecutors
began drafting special verdict forms to be used in submitting to the jury factors that increase
applicable statutory maximum sentences), and aggravating factors in capital cases, see Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585 (2002) (holding that juries and not judges must find aggravating
circumstances in death penalty cases).
86. United States v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780, 792 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993).
87. See Cynthia L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy, Criminal Collateral Estoppel
and the Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 319 (1992) (“Increasingly, courts
are using special interrogatories in RICO cases to compel the jury to specify the predicate acts
upon which a RICO conviction is based.” (footnote omitted)).
88. United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988).
89. The prosecution offered multiple predicate offenses, and the interrogatories asked the
jury to find that each RICO defendant participated in two predicate acts. Id. at 890.
90. See Marder, supra note 76, at 914 (explaining that the general verdict, where “[the jury]
says only whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and provides no reasons for its decision,”
gives the jury a private space to “interpret[] the judge’s instructions and decide[] whether and
how to follow them”).
91. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 284–
89 (1978).
92. Cf. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (discussing how, if a juror is
asked progressive questions, the “juror, wishing to acquit, may be formally catechized. . . . [and]
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“prohibited the Crown from punishing the jury for verdicts deemed
94
unlawful or rebellious.” And in the eighteenth century, a colonial
jury “[f]amously . . . acquitted printer John Peter Zenger of sedition
when he certainly violated the local law prohibiting criticisms aimed
95
at representatives . . . of the Crown.”
Despite the origins of the general verdict as a jury- and
defendant-protective device, “it is not obvious that preserving the
right to nullify is worth the cost to innocent defendants, who might be
relieved of the burdens of a false charge by a more informative
96
verdict.” As one federal judge has explained, “the general
verdict . . . confers on the jury a vast power to commit error and do
mischief by loading it with technical burdens far beyond its ability to
perform, by confusing it in aggregating instead of segregating the
issues, and by shrouding in secrecy and mystery the actual results of
97
its deliberations.” The general verdict obscures whether the jury has
exercised nullification or made a mistake about the evidence or the
98
law.
As the different readings of Yeager’s acquittal in Yeager I and II
demonstrate, it is almost impossible to determine from the words
“not guilty” what the jury has necessarily decided. This
determination, however, is required to invoke the collateral estoppel
protection, which the Supreme Court has deemed part of the Fifth
Amendment right against double jeopardy. Thus, in cases like Yeager
involving multiple offenses with common issues of underlying fact,
the opacity of the general verdict imperils the defendant’s access to
an important constitutional protection.
B. The Evolution of the Great Nullification Debate
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the
nullification question, and its allusions to nullification are

led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted,” but noting that “the
jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at more than logic”).
93. Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.).
94. Horowitz, supra note 67, at 428 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 429 (footnote omitted).
96. Leipold, supra note 21, at 1355.
97. Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948).
98. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 258 (2003) (“A
wrongheaded acquittal . . . is not necessarily nullification. . . . Identifying and separating
‘mistake’ from ‘nullification’ is difficult, making accurate assessment of data on the incidence of
either difficult.”).
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inconsistent. On the one hand, the Court has characterized the act of
99
producing verdicts returned for
nullification as “lawless,”
100
“impermissible reasons.”
On the other hand, the Court has
explained that it “would be totally alien to our notions of criminal
101
justice” to prohibit jury nullification. The Powell Court invoked the
latter idea when it described “the jury’s historic function[] in criminal
trials[] as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power
102
by the Executive Branch.” This tyranny-preventive view of the jury
is also apparent in the Supreme Court’s decision incorporating the
103
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
Despite efforts to silence nullification advocacy in the
104
courtroom, the nullification debate has continued to sound in both
105
academic circles and as part of a grass roots movement. Whereas
the opponents of nullification see it as a form of unchecked power to
be avoided, its champions see nullification as a desirable and
independent constitutional good. Other commentators accept
nullification as an inevitable corollary to courts’ traditional reluctance
106
to engage in post-verdict scrutiny.

99. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
100. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981).
101. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976).
102. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
103. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 145, 156 (1968) (“[T]he jury trial
provisions . . . reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance
to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in
the determination of guilt or innocence.”).
104. See generally Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998) (discussing the history of jury nullification
in state and federal courts, and arguing that the Constitution does not support jury nullification
and that great costs will result if the power is expanded beyond the level at which it exists
today).
105. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 194 (2005) (“Courts, by opting not to instruct
juries on nullification, have created a void into which special-interest groups and individuals
have stepped. These special-interest groups and individuals are often willing to undermine
respect for the jury and the court because its [sic] serves their organizational goals.”). Highprofile cases like the O.J. Simpson and Rodney King trials, suspected by many commentators to
be examples of nullification, have fueled this debate. Marder, supra note 76, at 877–78.
106. See JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 249 (“The doctrine that jurors cannot be held legally
accountable for their decisions . . . protects juries if they acquit in disregard of the law.”). Every
student of evidence reads Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 116–17, 127 (1987), in which the
Supreme Court refused to allow jurors who came forward to report shocking drug and alcohol
abuse to testify in a post-verdict evidentiary hearing. This decision serves several important
policy goals including protecting jurors from harassment by disgruntled litigants and preserving
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Professor Nancy Marder has explained that one’s view of
107
nullification depends on one’s conception of the jury’s proper role.
Adherents of the conventional view—that the jury’s role is to find
108
facts —see jury nullification as intruding on the province of the
109
judiciary, legislature, and executive and threatening the rule of
110
law. Under an alternative conception of the jury, which Professor
111
Marder calls the “process view,”
nullification provides the
112
legislative and executive branches with valuable feedback.
According to this view, the jury safeguards the individual defendant
113
by bridging the gap between necessarily general criminal statutes
and specific crimes and by checking national laws out of touch with
114
local standards.
Jurors inevitably approach their task armed with more than
115
logic, and this is seen, for the most part, as a desirable feature of the
criminal justice system. Judge Learned Hand, for example,
characterized the jury verdict as providing “slack [in] the enforcement
of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current

finality of process. Id. at 119–25. As the Tanner Court acknowledged, the jury system would not
likely “survive [post-verdict] efforts to perfect it.” Id. at 120.
107. Marder, supra note 76, at 880.
108. Judges typically instruct juries that they are factfinders. Id. at 904.
109. See id. at 905 (“The jury’s role is narrowly envisioned by the conventional view, and to
the extent juries perform more than fact finding or application of law in a narrow sense, they are
seen as overstepping their bounds in the political schema and threatening the other branches’
roles.”); id. at 907 (“[J]uries that nullify in response to social conditions . . . harm the legislature
and executive . . . by appropriating tasks that are best left to these other branches.”).
110. See id. (“To the judge . . . jury nullification is a form of insurrection, and not
surprisingly, judges often write or speak about nullification as leading to ‘chaos’ or ‘anarchy.’
Jury nullification is a threat not only to the judge’s task, but also to the premise of the judicial
system, which is that laws should be applied uniformly.” (footnote omitted)).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 926 (“[A] jury that acquits so as not to apply the law to a particular defendant
provides feedback to the executive and a jury that acquits so as not to apply a bad law provides
feedback to the legislature . . . .”).
113. See id. at 927 (explaining that “the nullifying jury . . . can [] be viewed as assisting the
legislature” because legislators must “create general laws both because they cannot foresee
every variation that may arise and also because legislators may have competing views about
what should be included in legislation and must settle for broad language if any laws are to be
passed”).
114. See id. at 929 (“This occurred with the Fugitive Slave Act, in which Northern juries
often refused to give effect to the law.”).
115. Id. at 911 (“[The jurors] must engage in a weighing of the evidence presented by the
State, and it is likely that this amorphous process . . . will be shaped by attitudes they hold on a
wide range of issues, from whether they distrust the State and worry about it abusing its power
to how vulnerable they feel to crime . . . .”).
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117

ethical conventions.” In Duncan v. Lousiana, in which the
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,
the Court invoked a classic study of the jury to support the
proposition that “when juries differ with the result at which the judge
would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the
very purposes for which they were created and for which they are
118
now employed.”
The Supreme Court’s conception of the jury’s proper role is
nevertheless uncertain, and the Court has never spoken directly to
119
the nullification question. In Sparf v. United States, the Court held
that it is the court’s duty to define the law and the jury’s duty to apply
120
it. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, suggested that the Framers
were not uniformly in favor of preserving the possibility of
nullification and expressed concern about giving juries too much
power:
If a petit jury can rightfully exercise [nullification] over one statute
of Congress, they must have an equal right and power over any
other statute, and indeed over all the statutes. . . . If this power be
once admitted, petit jurors will be superior to the national
121
legislature, and its laws will be subject to their control.

In a later case, though, the Court stepped back from its antinullification position, explaining that Sparf does “not support [the]
122
concept of the criminal jury as mere factfinder.” The Court drew a
distinction between “tell[ing] the jury what the applicable law is” and
123
“requir[ing] the jury to apply the law,” which the Court held would
be inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment.
The notion that the jury serves as a final check on prosecutorial
and legislative authority accords well with the Framers’ system of
checks and balances; however, jury nullification may also be a

116. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942), rev’d on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
117. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
118. Id. at 157 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4 n.2
(1966)).
119. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
120. Id. at 100–03.
121. Id. at 71 (quoting United States v. Callendar, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C. Va. 1800)).
122. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511–15 (1995).
123. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 68 (2000).

FERGUSON IN FINAL.DOC

1214

2/11/2010 12:36:42 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1195

124

dangerous form of unchecked power. Some historical examples of
nullification, such as Southern white juries’ refusal to convict whites
charged with crimes against African Americans, are rightly
125
condemned. In the modern era, so-called “Bronx juries” have
stirred up concerns about abuse of the jury’s unreviewable
126
discretion. Furthermore, it may no longer be as desirable for juries
127
to second-guess the legislature as it was in the Framers’ day.
III. THE SOLUTION: SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS CLARIFYING THE
ISSUES OF ULTIMATE FACT COMMON TO OVERLAPPING OFFENSES
Improving the clarity of the jury’s verdict using special verdict
forms would benefit defendants like Yeager seeking to invoke the
collateral estoppel protection. Special verdict forms could also benefit
prosecutors seeking to salvage a hung count. Section A of this Part
proposes creating a federal rule of criminal procedure to standardize
the use of special verdict forms in cases like Yeager—cases involving
overlapping but not coextensive charges based on the same
underlying conduct. As Section B explains, the proposal advocates for
clarity and legitimacy for their own sake, along lines that will
frequently favor defendants but may also favor the government.
Indeed, the government is a beneficiary any time the jury is forced to
be more rational. Section C concludes this Part by anticipating and
responding to a likely critique of the proposal—that it would impinge
on the jury’s traditional prerogative to exercise lenity.

124. See JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 263 (“We do not want people ‘taking the law into their
own hands.’”).
125. See ABRAMSON, supra note 123, at 61–62 (describing this “vicious side to jury
nullification”).
126. Marder, supra note 76, at 901. In a highly controversial law review article, Professor
Paul Butler openly encouraged African-American juries to engage in nullification to protest the
criminal justice system’s treatment of African-American defendants. See Paul Butler, Racially
Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 709–12
(1995) (explaining that the jury is the only forum for democratic change accessible by African
Americans).
127. John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 507 (2002) (“As
society has become more heterogeneous and more complex, legislatures have to make difficult
policy choices taking account of a range of considerations including morality, political feasibility
and social and economic consequences and juries are just not equipped to reevaluate these
policy judgments.”).
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A. The Proposal: A Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure on Special
Verdicts
The Framers could not have anticipated the need to apply the
collateral estoppel doctrine in the criminal context to vindicate the
128
protection against double jeopardy. Thus, the disconnect between
the Framers’ preference for the general verdict, on the one hand, and
the requirement of a determination of what a jury necessarily decided
to invoke the collateral estoppel protection, on the other hand, is
understandable. By constructing special verdict forms tracking the
issues of underlying fact common to overlapping but not coextensive
charges, trial courts can bridge this gap and shore up the defendant’s
protection against double jeopardy.
In contrast to the ex post solution proposed by other
129
commentators, this Note recommends pre-verdict intervention to
ascertain the preclusive effect of an acquittal in cases like Yeager. Preverdict intervention is consistent with the Supreme Court’s systemic
reluctance to engage in post-verdict scrutiny, for which there is a
130
sound policy rationale. Insulating jury deliberations promotes full
131
132
and frank communication, protects jurors from harassment, and
133
helps ensure finality of process. The Supreme Court has invoked
these concerns not only to justify its do-nothing approach to
134
inconsistent verdicts but also to justify the longstanding rule that
135
juror testimony is inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict. Indeed,

128. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807,
1829 (1997) (“[T]he most sensible approach would be to allow (but not oblige) the defendant to
request specific findings from the jury after the jury has rendered its general verdict.”); Randall,
supra note 87, at 317–25 (proposing that acquitted defendants be given the opportunity to
request a special interrogatory, but “only after the jury reaches a general verdict of acquittal”).
130. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68−69 (1984).
131. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987).
132. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (arguing that allowing juror testimony to
impeach a verdict would encourage “harass[ment] . . . by the defeated party in an effort to
secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a
verdict”).
133. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120 (“Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or
inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously
disrupt the finality of the process.”).
134. See supra note 80.
135. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121 (“Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is grounded in the commonlaw rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror
testimony relating to extraneous influences.”).
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the insulation of the jury’s verdict from second-guessing is a feature
136
without which the criminal justice system could not likely survive.
As Professor Mark Brodin has observed, “the history of the jury
is one of constant tension between the desire to preserve its
independence on the one hand and to constrain its discretion on the
137
other.” This Note respectfully suggests that, in light of the problem
illustrated by Yeager, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
through its Committee on Criminal Rules, consider drafting and
adopting a special verdict form for use in cases like Yeager involving
overlapping but not coextensive charges based on the same
underlying facts.
Establishing a federal rule of criminal procedure in this vein
would legitimize the use of special verdicts in the criminal context and
promote uniform access to the collateral estoppel protection for
similarly situated defendants. The new rule should be analogous to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49, which provides judges with two
procedural options for using special verdict forms. But several of the
options outlined in Rule 49 would need to be hemmed to fit the
constitutional dimensions of the criminal context.
138
Under the first procedural option described in Rule 49, the jury
resolves specified factual issues and the judge determines whether the
defendant is liable under the law controlling those facts. This
procedure would not be acceptable in the criminal context. Under no
circumstances may a federal judge direct a verdict of guilty in a
139
criminal case. Under the second procedural option described in
140
Rule 49, the jury returns forms for a general verdict as well as

136. Id. at 120 (“There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct
would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or
improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such
efforts to perfect it.”).
137. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—
The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 25–26 (1990).
138. The rule provides: “The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the
form of a special written finding on each issue of fact. . . . by [either] submitting written
questions susceptible of a categorical or other brief answer; submitting written forms of the
special findings that might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or using any
other method that the court considers appropriate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (emphasis added)
(headings omitted).
139. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105–06 (1895).
140. The rule provides: “The court may submit to the jury forms for a general verdict,
together with written questions on one or more issues of fact that the jury must decide. The court
must give the instructions and explanations necessary to enable the jury to render a general
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written questions on one or more issues of fact that the jury must
decide. This procedure would also require modification in the
criminal context. In the civil context, the judge can use the jury’s
141
answers to the special interrogatories to override its verdict. But in
the criminal context, the jury must retain the power to make the
142
ultimate determination of guilt.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a
criminal defendant has the right to demand that the jury find him
143
guilty of every element of the offense charged. Thus, trial judges are
144
required to instruct the jury on every element of the offense. In
addition, many judges—although they are not required to do so—will
145
give the jury written instructions. Surveys have shown that lawyers
and jurors generally favor giving the jury access to written
146
instructions during deliberation.
verdict and answer the questions in writing, and must direct the jury to do both.” FED. R. CIV. P.
49 (emphasis added) (headings omitted).
141. See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 8.08, at 555 (5th ed. 2000) (explaining that, in the event that
one or more of the jury’s answers “is irreconcilably inconsistent with the general verdict, the
answers prevail and judgment may be entered pursuant to Civil Rule 58 in accordance with the
answers notwithstanding the general verdict, or, the court may return the jury for further
consideration of its answers and verdict or order a new trial”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 49
(“When the general verdict and the answers are consistent, the court must approve, for entry
under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment on the verdict and answers. . . . When the answers are
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court
may [either] approve, for entry under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment according to the
answers, notwithstanding the general verdict; direct the jury to further consider its answers and
verdict; or order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or
more is also inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment must not be entered; instead, the
court must direct the jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must order a new trial.”
(headings omitted)).
142. The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury “includes, of course, as its most important
element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’”
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
143. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995).
144. O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 7.03, at 470.
145. Id. at 509. In European countries, judges provide the jury with detailed written
information to guide their deliberations. See Jackson, supra note 127, at 518 (noting that judges
in Belgium, Demark, and Norway provide juries with “a written list of ingredients concerning
each offence, possible defenses and mitigating factors”). Spain, in particular, has an extremely
accountable jury system. Id. at 518–19 (explaining that in Spain “the parties draw up with the
judge a document containing the facts put forward by the prosecution and defense in the course
of the trial” and then “[a]fter voting on each of these issues, the jury has to draw up a document
under the five headings of the facts declared proved, the facts not proved, the declaration guilty
or not guilty, the reasons for why they consider the facts proved or not and, finally, the voting
incidents during deliberation”).
146. William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 119, 131.
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Special verdict forms tracking the overlapping issues of law and
fact in cases like Yeager would aid the jury in its deliberations. As is
the practice with jury instructions, the judicial conferences for each
district could draft model special verdict forms tracking the general
overlap between overlapping but not coextensive charges. Then, the
parties could adapt the general form to fit the specific issues in the
case. The trial judge would arbitrate the parties’ negotiation of the
forms.
The procedures governing the formulation of special verdict
forms should mirror those governing jury instructions found in
147
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Specifically, parties should
submit their requests for special verdict forms to the judge and other
148
parties at the close of evidence. And, just as Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 30 gives the court broad discretion to determine
149
the propriety of requested instructions, this Note’s proposal would
vest discretion in the trial judge to determine the ultimate content of
special verdict forms. The judge should show the trial lawyers the
special verdict forms before closing arguments “so that [counsel] may
150
intelligently argue the case to the jury.” The court must also give
counsel an opportunity to object to special verdict forms before they
are submitted to the jury, as is the practice with regard to jury
151
instructions. To ensure that the trial court has an opportunity,
before the jury retires, to address any errors in a special verdict form,
the failure to make a timely objection should operate as it does with
instructions: unless there has been “plain error affecting substantial
152
rights,” the right to object on appeal to the instructions made to the
153
jury is waived. As in the civil context, timely objections to special
147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
148. Cf. id.
149. See O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 7.03, at 466 (explaining that it is in the court’s
discretion to refuse requests that are biased, unclear, or redundant).
150. United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1262 (3d Cir. 1979)).
151. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (“A party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a
failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and the
grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate. An opportunity must be given to
object out of the jury’s hearing and, on request, out of the jury’s presence.”); O’MALLEY ET AL.,
supra note 141, § 7.04, at 480–81 (“Objections, under the civil and criminal rules, must be made
out of the hearing of the jury, and upon request in criminal cases, out of the jury’s presence.”).
152. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
153. See id. 30(d) (“Failure to object in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review,
except as permitted under Rule 52(b).”); O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 7.01, at 457
(“Failure to interpose a timely and specific objection to possible error or omission in the
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verdict forms should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
154
standard.
Given the presumption of innocence and the traditional
preference for using general verdicts, a trial judge arbitrating the
negotiation of special verdict forms should give solicitude to the
defendant. The judge must take care in drafting special
interrogatories to avoid inappropriately leading the jury’s
deliberations. The judge should also give great weight to a
155
defendant’s objection to a special verdict form.
Courts tend to accept special interrogatories proposed to benefit
156
defendants, but they do not typically submit special interrogatories
157
to the jury over the defendant’s objection. This latter tactic is not
158
viewed favorably on appeal. In United States v. Spock, for example,
the First Circuit held that it was prejudicial for the district court to
submit, over the defendants’ timely objection to their form and
content, ten yes or no questions to the jury to be answered in addition
159
to the general verdict.
If agreement on a special verdict form cannot be reached, it may
be necessary to default to the general verdict. In United States v.
160
Ogando, for example, the defendants requested blank-form special
interrogatories on the predicates to a continuing criminal enterprise
charge. The judge preferred constructing a multiple-choice form,
reasoning that the complexity of the case required more instruction

instructions made by the trial court results in waiver of the objection on appeal unless there has
been plain error affecting substantial rights.”).
154. Giving judges the discretion over the submission, form, and content of special verdict
forms introduces the potential for abuse of that discretion. In the civil context, abuse of this
discretion constitutes reversible error, O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 8.10, at 572 (“A trial
court’s refusal to utilize a special verdict or interrogatory requested by the defendant is subject
to an abuse of discretion standard.”), but reversal occurs rarely, id. at 541.
155. See Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in
Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 298 (2003) (“If there would be serious
harm to the defendant . . . then the court should not give the special verdict, even if the benefit
would be great.”).
156. Randall, supra note 87, at 322.
157. JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 251 (“Federal and state courts usually do not allow special
verdicts or interrogatories if the criminal defendant objects to their use.”).
158. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
159. See id. at 182–83 (“There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of
guilty than to approach it step by step.”).
160. United States v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1992).
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161

The defendants rejected the judge’s proposed
for the jury.
162
alternatives, however, and general verdicts were ultimately used.
B. The Benefits of the Proposal to Defendants and the Criminal
Justice System at Large
The offenses in the Yeager case—insider trading and securities
fraud—are good candidates for using a special verdict form. The same
underlying conduct can sustain a conviction on both charges, but the
charges do not necessarily require the same proof in a given case.
That is, the charges are overlapping but not coextensive. The
securities fraud charges against Yeager were brought under 15 U.S.C
163
§ 78j(b), 15 U.S.C § 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The indictment
alleged that Yeager “made false and misleading statements at the
January 20, 2000, analyst conference or that he failed to state facts
necessary to prevent statements made by others from being
164
misleading.” The insider trading charges were brought under 15
165
U.S.C § 78j(b), 15 U.S.C § 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1. The
indictment alleged that Yeager “made 20 separate sales of Enron
stock ‘while in the possession of material non-public information
regarding the technological capabilities, value, revenue and business
166
performance of [EBS].’”
Although the securities fraud and insider trading charges in
167
Yeager’s case appear very similar on the elements, they are not

161. Id. at 147–48.
162. Id. at 148.
163. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 n.1 (2009).
164. Id. at 2363.
165. Id. at 2363 n.1.
166. Id. at 2363–64 (quoting Fifth Superseding Indictment at 31, United States v. Hirko, No.
H-03-93-05, 2004 WL 5653075 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2004).
167. Yeager’s jury was instructed that, to convict on the securities fraud charges, the
government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant either (i)
employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (ii) made any untrue statement
or material omission of fact, or (iii) engaged in an act of fraud and deceit; and (2)
acted willfully, knowingly, and with the intent to defraud; and (3) used, or caused to
be used, any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails.
United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2006). To convict on
insider trading, the jury was instructed that the government was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that:
(1) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant employed a
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) acted willfully, knowingly, and with the
intent to defraud; (3) used, or caused to be used, any means or instrumentality of
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coextensive. Both the securities fraud and insider trading charges
required the government to prove a knowing violation of Section
168
169
10(b) and Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
But whereas the securities fraud counts alleged a violation of SEC
170
Rule 10b-5, the insider trading counts alleged a violation of SEC
171
Rule 10b5-1, which the SEC adopted in 2000. Under Rule 10b5-1, a
trade is “on the basis” of material nonpublic information when the
trader is “aware” of material nonpublic information when making a
purchase or sale, based on the “position that one who is aware of
interstate commerce; and (4) used material, nonpublic information in his purchase or
sale of Enron stock.
Id.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) makes it unlawful
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securitiesbased swap agreement . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) criminalizes willful violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . or any rule or
regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of
which is required under the terms of this chapter, or any person who willfully and
knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or
document required to be filed under this chapter, or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in
subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any self-regulatory organization in
connection with an application for membership or participation therein or to become
associated with a member thereof, which statement was false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000,
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when such person is a
person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed;
but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of
any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or
regulation.
Id. § 78ff(a).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
171. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154 (Aug. 15, 2000).
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inside information at the time of trading will have inevitably made
172
use of such information.” Under the classical theory of insider
trading, it suffices for conviction to prove that an insider defendant
traded while in possession of material, nonpublic information. This
violates the “relationship of trust and confidence [that exists] between
the shareholders of a corporation and [the] insider[] who ha[s]
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with
173
that corporation.”
Yeager’s indictment did not specify whether alleged false
statements and omissions made at the 2000 analyst conference and in
press releases were directly linked to the allegations that Yeager
174
possessed insider information. Yeager, however, argued that the
175
indictment implied this direct link. In Yeager I the district court
noted that insider trading counts did not mention the 2000 analyst
conference or the press releases and concluded that “the fate of the
insider trading counts is not necessarily decided by the fate of
176
the . . . securities fraud counts.” But the Fifth Circuit settled the
issue in Yeager’s favor, concluding that, “the jury, acting rationally,
could have acquitted Yeager on securities fraud only by concluding
177
that he did not have insider information.”
If the Fifth Circuit’s Ashe analysis is accurate, then Yeager’s jury
either was confused, struck a compromise, or exercised its power to
dispense lenity when it acquitted Yeager on the securities charges
without also acquitting him on the insider trading charges. On

172. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 347 (4th ed. 2007).
173. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (footnote omitted); see also United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (“Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of
insider trading liability, [the rules] are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities
of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.”).
174. Fifth Superseding Indictment at 21–22, United States v. Hirko, No. H-03-93-05, 2004
WL 5653075 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2004); see also United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp.
2d 719, 728–29 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Furthermore, the insider trading counts against Defendant
Yeager do not rely upon allegations of false statements and omissions made at the 2000 Analyst
Conference and in press releases. The title of the insider trading counts does not mention the
2000 Analyst Conference and press releases, and nor does the text of the counts.”).
175. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (“With regard to the insider trading counts, Defendant
Yeager specifically argues that ‘[a]t no point did the Government explain what material,
nonpublic information Yeager was in possession of except by implication: when he allegedly
made statements or omissions at the 2000 Analyst Conference and in press releases, Yeager
knew that those statements were false, and that knowledge constituted material, nonpublic
information that he was not permitted to trade on.’” (citation omitted)).
176. Id. at 729.
177. United States v. Yeager (Yeager II), 521 F.3d 367, 376–77 (5th Cir. 2008).
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remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit upheld this
178
reading of the record. Had Yeager been able to request a special
verdict form with interrogatories clarifying the issues of ultimate fact
common to the insider trading and fraud charges, the jury may not
have deadlocked, resulting in an acquittal on both sets of charges.
Although using special verdicts in cases like Yeager will
frequently favor defendants, their use could sometimes favor the
government. If Yeager I’s Ashe analysis was correct, for example, then
Yeager’s jury acted rationally in acquitting him of securities fraud yet
failing to reach a verdict on the insider trading charges. Under this
scenario, the government should not be barred from reprosecuting
179
him on the insider trading charges. Had the jury been given a
special verdict form with interrogatories tracking the underlying
issues of fact common to the securities and insider trading charges, it
might have revealed a rational deadlock based on the evidence.
Considering the disparate Ashe analyses in Yeager I and II, it is
possible that the jury would have split the charges rationally if given
such a special verdict form. From the government’s perspective, a
mixed outcome that is demonstrably rational is better than the
apparently irrational result in Yeager. A rational mistried charge can
180
be salvaged without implicating collateral estoppel concerns.
Ideally, engaging in a forward-looking analysis at the close of
evidence and constructing special verdict forms clarifying the issues
181
would prevent jury mistake and confusion altogether. As one
178. United States v. Yeager (Yeager IV), 334 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Today,
freed from the chains of Larkin it is clear under our initial Ashe analysis the jury made a finding
in acquitting Yeager that precludes prosecution on insider trading . . . . We are satisfied that the
panel conducted a proper review of Yeager’s claim and the required collateral estoppel analysis
under Ashe and will not do so again. We decline the invitation to revisit our settled findings.”).
179. See infra note 180.
180. See Preliminary Proceedings: Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. 219, 452 (2009) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a retrial following a
mistrial if, ‘taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for
[declaring a mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated [by not allowing
a retrial].’” (citation omitted)).
181. Field experiments have shown that juries that are given special verdict forms are better
informed about the evidence, more understanding of the judge’s instructions, and more
confident in the accuracy of their verdict. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial
Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29
(1994) (finding that the use of special verdict forms provided the greatest benefits by assisting
jurors with legal and evidentiary complexity); Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler,
Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (finding
partial support for the theory that special verdict forms improve comprehension of jury
instructions).
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commentator has noted, “the special verdict can improve the
deliberation process by packaging the dispute in distinct, manageable
components, by focusing the jurors’ attention on those critical issues,
and by exerting pressure on them to decide those issues based solely
182
on the evidence because their special findings will be recorded.” By
clarifying what the jury necessarily decided, a special verdict form
could improve an acquitted defendant’s access to the collateral
estoppel protection, minimizing the need for unnecessary relitigation
183
and saving precious judicial and prosecutorial resources. In addition
to reducing the need for post-trial expenditure of these resources,
special verdicts can also save resources during the trial by
“expedit[ing] litigation because instructions are easier for the judge to
184
frame at trial.”
C. Anticipating and Responding to the Lenity Critique
When it comes to the form of a verdict, there is a tradeoff
between lenity and precision: preserving the possibility of
nullification by using the general verdict sacrifices clarity and
accuracy. For two reasons, the tradeoff between lenity and precision
weighs in favor of using special verdict forms in cases involving
multiple overlapping but coextensive federal criminal charges. First,
the risk that a jury will return inconsistent verdicts out of mistake or
185
186
confusion is heightened when the substance or sheer volume of
the evidence challenges the limits of the jurors’ memories and
understanding. Second, defendants charged with multiple,
overlapping offenses are more vulnerable to successive prosecution,
placing accuracy at a premium.
Critics of this Note’s proposal will likely argue that guilty
defendants will be worse off if juries are unable to nullify under the
cover of the general verdict. There are two responses to this

182. Brodin, supra note 137, at 58 (footnote omitted).
183. Randall, supra note 87, at 319.
184. Brodin, supra note 137, at 59 (explaining that in general verdict jury trials, “the judge
must fully instruct the jury both on the law and its application to all possible constructions of the
evidence”).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1115−18 (7th Cir. 1994)
(characterizing the government’s efforts to explain the structure of a racketeering scheme in
violation of RICO as “decidedly less than elegant”).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that cases
involving a continuing course of criminal conduct or multiple defendants may require a “recall
of Homeric proportions” from jurors).
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argument. First, even when special verdict forms are employed, juries
disposed to acquit the defendant against the weight of the evidence
187
could still do so based on reasonable doubt. Indeed, the special
verdict form should include a question paralleling the reasonable
doubt instruction that the jury receives. Thus, if it intends to nullify,
the jury can indicate on the special verdict form that the government
failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second response to the argument that defendants will be
worse off if special verdict forms are given to the jury is this: various
changes in the criminal justice system since the Framers’ time have
affected the degree to which the nullification-regarding features of
the system actually serve the interests of defendants. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, for example, greatly limit the jury’s ability to
bring the defendant’s punishment in line with what the jury perceives
188
to be the defendant’s crime against society. Although a jury might
intuit that convicting a defendant of fewer counts will reduce the
189
defendant’s ultimate punishment, so long as the jury convicts the
defendant on at least one count, all relevant conduct—including
acquitted conduct—can typically be introduced at the sentencing
190
191
phase. Short of acquitting the defendant of all charges, a jury can

187. Marder, supra note 76, at 885–87 (noting that jurors “could nullify, but then say that
their decision was based on reasonable doubt”); see also JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 258
(explaining that jurors who acquit despite strong evidence of guilt consistently report having
reasonable doubts, as opposed to disregarding the law).
188. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), preserved real offense sentencing by
making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory. Id. at 246. The available evidence shows
that most judges still follow the Guidelines even though they are no longer mandatory. See
NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
240–44 (4th. ed. Supp. 2008) (providing empirical evidence that most judges post-Booker have
followed the Guidelines). For a discussion of the jury’s evolving role in criminal sentencing, see
Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 34–44 (2003).
189. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The vogue for
repetitious multiple count indictments may well produce an increase in seemingly inconsistent
jury verdicts, where in fact the jury is using its power to prevent the punishment from getting
too far out of line with the crime.” (citation omitted)).
190. See Leipold, supra note 21, at 1332 (“The Federal Sentencing Guidelines require the
judge to look at all the charged conduct, and increase the sentence if a preponderance of the
evidence suggests guilt on the acquitted charges. . . . The imprecision of the general verdict
permits this second evaluation of the evidence.” (footnote omitted)); Muller, supra note 70, at
776 (“[I]t has become increasingly common for courts to sentence defendants on the basis of
conduct of which they were acquitted—even inconsistently acquitted.” (footnote omitted)); see
also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that “a jury’s verdict
of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the
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only influence the severity of the defendant’s sentence by convicting
the defendant only on the charge or charges with the lowest statutory
192
maximum. This is unlikely because the jury is not instructed on the
193
sentencing consequences attached to the various charges.
The Supreme Court’s nostalgia for the Framers’ vision of
nullification as a tyranny-preventive device is in tension with modern
194
district court judges’ efforts to nullification-proof the courtroom. In
195
contrast to the practice in the Framers’ day, nullification advocacy
196
by defense counsel is strictly prohibited. Most modern jurors are
completely unaware that they have the discretion to acquit a guilty
197
defendant, and judges exclude jurors who demonstrate willingness
198
to engage in nullification. “In most instances today, for jury
acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence”).
191. But see Leipold, supra note 21, at 1331–32 (“As every defense lawyer knows, an
acquittal on fewer than all charges may be a hollow victory. . . . Thus, if defendant is charged
with committing three bank robberies, and the jury convicts on the first count and acquits on the
other two, the judge may still punish the defendant as if he had been convicted on all three
counts.” (footnote omitted)).
192. In this event, the ceiling imposed by the statutory maximum would prevent acquitted
conduct from coming in. Of course, the number of convicted counts—which the jury does
control—can make a difference in terms of the defendant’s stigma and ultimate punishment
under the Guidelines. But jurors are never instructed about the sentencing implications of their
decisions. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1134 n.249 (2001) (“Juries are not told about penalties and
indeed are forbidden to consider them.”).
193. Id.
194. See GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 15, at 197 (“Concomitant with the refusal to
instruct the jury concerning nullification, courts have further held that counsel may not argue
that theory in closing argument . . . .”).
195. For example, Alexander Hamilton urged jurors to disregard their instructions and
consider the propriety of the law in the seditious libel case of American journalist John Peter
Zenger, and the jury returned its now-famous not guilty verdict. See ABRAMSON, supra note
123, at 73−75.
196. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (refusing to instruct
the jury on nullification, reasoning that “[a]n explicit instruction to a jury conveys an implied
approval that runs the risk of degrading the legal structure requisite for true freedom, for an
ordered liberty that protects against anarchy as well as tyranny”).
197. See Marder, supra note 76, at 944 (“Jurors, who may have little knowledge of the
history of the jury, may have no familiarity with the jury’s power to nullify.” (footnote
omitted)); see also David C. Brody & Craig Rivera, Examining the Dougherty “All-Knowing
Assumption”: Do Jurors Know About Their Jury Nullification Power?, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 151,
166 (1997) (explaining that most people do not know about the jury’s ability to nullify).
198. Nullification-intent jurors have been dismissed even after the jury has begun to
deliberate. For example, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d
Cir. 1997), that a trial judge alerted to the fact that a juror is urging nullification should
interview the juror and remove him upon confirmation of his intent to nullify. Id. at 617. This

FERGUSON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

2/11/2010 12:36:42 AM

A CASE FOR SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS

1227

nullification to succeed, it must remain subterranean,
199
Therefore, the practice of
unacknowledged, and undetected.”
nullification has lost a significant part of its tyranny-preventive value;
covert nullification does not give the legislature any incentive to fix
200
problem statutes.
Finally, although nullification has existed since colonial days,
some commentators reject the idea that nullification has any legal
201
basis. For example, Professor Andrew Leipold has observed that
the courts have never explicitly approved nullification nor is there
historical evidence that nullification is “embedded” in the Sixth
202
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Whether borne of confusion, compromise, or lenity, jury
inconsistency harms defendants’ constitutionally protected interest in
the finality of acquittals. In today’s overfederalized and
overcriminalized system, the average defendant’s interest in
improving accuracy outweighs a defendant’s interest in preserving the
possibility of nullification. Especially when multiple charges require
the resolution of a common issue of ultimate fact, clarifying the
overlapping issues and what the jury actually decides would protect a
defendant.
In contrast, a general verdict can harm a defendant. In Yeager’s
case, for example, the opacity of the jury’s acquittals precluded him
from barring relitigation of issues of fact common to the acquittals
and the hung counts.

case required the court to navigate the conflict between the trial judge’s “duty to dismiss jurors
for misconduct” and the duty to “safeguard[] the secrecy of jury deliberations.” Id. at 618. After
weighing the competing interests, the court concluded that, once jury deliberations begin, trial
judges should only interfere when issues are brought to their attention. Id. at 621–22. The trial
judge had dismissed one juror after receiving a note from another juror that this juror had a
“predisposed disposition” to nullify. Id. at 611. The Second Circuit took issue not with the trial
judge’s ability to dismiss a juror who is intent on nullification but with the fact that the trial
judge dismissed the juror without making sufficient inquiry on his intent to nullify. Id. at 618.
199. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 240 (2007).
200. See Marder, supra note 76, at 906 (“[I]f jurors nullify to militate against the effects of a
bad law, they reduce the legislature’s incentive to act, thus increasing the chances that a bad law
will remain on the books. A nullifying jury only masks the defective law by attempting to fix it
on an ad hoc basis when what is required is a uniform correction.”).
201. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View,
54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 504 (1976).
202. Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 283 (1996).
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A federal rule of criminal procedure giving district court judges
discretion to submit special verdict forms to the jury would make
their use more routine and uniform in the criminal context. The
prevention of jury mistake and the preclusion of unnecessary
relitigation would not only protect defendants from double jeopardy
but would also promote efficiency in the allocation of scarce judicial
and prosecutorial resources. This savings should substantially offset
the costs associated with formulating special verdict forms upon
which the parties can agree.

